The Yankee mining squadron : $b or, laying the North Sea mine barrageBelknap, Reginald Rowan
History
The Yankee mining squadron : $b or, laying the North Sea mine barrage
Belknap, Reginald Rowan
Submarine mines; United States. Navy; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations -- Submarine
As we had expected to use the British signal system, a special training
class was formed at Newport in January, while the minelayers were fitting
out. In consequence, from first falling in with British destroyers, the
_San Francisco_ communicated easily, and British flags could be used on
the first excursion. But neither the British system nor our own was found
to suit our needs, and to combine British flags with American meanings
made a risk of misinterpretation at a critical time. So the American
flags were restored to use and the British ones discontinued, except
a few retained by each ship for calls and other routine uses, while
the flagship kept a full set, for communicating with the escort by the
British code. A new system, embodying several of the British features,
was devised, mainly by Lieut. Commander E. S. R. Brandt, then flag
lieutenant, and was put into effect on the second excursion. The main
feature was that the meaning of tactical signals—those which required
immediate action, affecting the ships’ movements—was self-evident to
anyone who knew the names of the flags.
Flags and associations already familiar having been utilized, the
signalmen quickly learned. Separation among three anchorages prevented
signal practice by the squadron as a whole in port, but drills several
times daily at each anchorage and on the way out to the mining ground
enabled the new code to be used on the full squadron’s first trip. Great
interest was evident among the signal forces of all ships. Signals were
habitually hoisted only just long enough, as determined by experience,
for the average vessel to repeat the hoist. Competition became keen
not to be the cause of delay, and very soon the signaling attained
an accuracy, rapidity, and style comparing favorably with the best
performance of any type of vessel. Once or twice the _Quinnebaug_—whose
mast was not high—beat the flagship in getting her own signal up to the
yardarm. Less than a minute by day, and often only 30 seconds, would
suffice between giving an order for a tactical signal and beginning its
execution by the squadron—without a glance at a key book or card at
either end. Most efficient telephone service would hardly equal that.
The _Vampire_ soon picked up our new system, so that signals to her
could frequently be dispensed with. Upon one of ours going up, the
corresponding British signal on _Vampire_ would be seen in a few moments.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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