Accuracy of transmission and of record being very important where so much was done by signal, these were stimulated by daily comparison of the signal records of all ships. A “discrepancy” sheet was compiled, to show the errors and omissions of each ship for the previous day, and directly after each excursion, the signal officers would meet, to compare the signal records of the trip. A further check was kept by a staff officer being constantly on watch on board the _San Francisco_ when at sea, taking notes upon incidents and errors in signals, station-keeping, and the behavior of ships. The Recording Angel could not have been more observant. I would edit the rough record at the end of a watch, references to the pertinent instructions were entered, and a smooth “Discrepancy Report” was sent to all ships at the end of the excursion, as a reminder of their sins. Had the signal officers been regulars and but one system of signals been in use from the beginning, the high standard maintained would have been commendable. The attainment of such a standard by inexperienced personnel, adopting a new system on very short notice, was highly creditable to all concerned. Especially should there be mention of Chief Quartermaster William H. Kerins, of the _San Francisco_, and the other chiefs, whose training and management of their signalmen and whose own skill and fidelity made our quick and accurate communication possible. CHAPTER FOURTEEN THE BARRIER ACROSS The barrage began to show results early in July, after our second excursion, although not yet half across. The enemy submarines changed their route then, so as to go through Fair Island Channel, south instead of north of the Shetlands. Thus they would pass west of the partial barrage, through the 60-mile wide passage still open. The fact of Area A having been proclaimed gave ample warning, and even the enemy could not complain of being ambushed, if he sustained damage there. Advertising a minefield two months in advance was certainly fair play. But now came the mining of Area B, which would carry the barrier clear across the last 45 miles of the 230-mile stretch. This was not published, but the enemy might have assumed that it would be done sooner or later.