The Organized Reserve was exceeded as a reservoir of potential man power by the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve, which had a total of 90,044 men and women on 30 June 1950. This total included 2,267 volunteer reservists on continuous active duty with the regular establishment, about 5,000 training in some 200 volunteer training units, and 1316 in the Fleet Reserve. Altogether, the strength of all Marine reserve components (less volunteer reservists on active duty) amounted to a total of 128,959, or nearly double the number of Marines in the regular establishment.[38] [38] _Ibid._, 1–5, 6. Behind every Marine regular, figuratively speaking, stood two reservists who were ready to step forward and fill the gaps in the ranks. Thus it was scarcely far-fetched when some inspired public information officer coined the phrase “Minute Men of 1950” for these recent civilians who made it possible for the 1st Marine Division to hit the beaches at Inchon. Events moved swiftly on 19 July. Only a few hours after the receipt of CinCFE’s third request, the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve was authorized by President Truman with the sanction of Congress. Headquarters Marine Corps, on the hill overlooking the Pentagon, was ablaze with lights that summer night; and decisions were made which enabled four important steps to be taken next day: (1) a warning to Reserve District directors that the Organized Reserve would soon be ordered to active duty; (2) notification to commanding generals to expect some 21,000 Organized Reservists shortly at Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton, and about 5,800 at Marine Barracks, Camp Lejeune; (3) orders issued by CMC, with the approval of CNO, to discontinue the practice of discharging reservists at their own request; (4) the first reservists--22 units with a total strength of 4,830 men--ordered to active duty with a delay of ten days.[39] [39] _Ibid._, II-2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still not convinced that a Marine force could be embarked to meet General MacArthur’s deadline of 10 September without stripping FMFLant units to a dangerous extent. On the advice of Admiral Sherman, they informed CinCFE on 20 July that a Marine division could not be sent before November or even December. General Shepherd had a great deal to do with shaping the ultimate decision. On the 20th, when CNO conferred with Admiral Radford on the question of a Marine division, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet in his turn asked the opinion of the Marine general. General Shepherd replied that a Marine amphibious striking force could be raised for the proposed Inchon landing without seriously weakening the Fleet Marine Force as a whole. This striking force, he predicted, would prove to be “the key of achievement of a timely and economical decision for our arms.”[40] [40] CG FMFPac memo to CinCPacFlt, 20 Jul 50.