U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
While they were discussing the tactical problems, the commander in
chief returned to his office. He summoned his chief of staff for a
brief conference, then requested that Smith be presented.
MacArthur shook hands warmly, grasping the Marine general’s elbow with
his left hand. Without the celebrated “scrambled eggs” cap, he looked
his 70 years in moments of fatigue, but the old fire and dash were
not lacking. The very simplicity of his attire--shirtsleeves and open
collar--made a dramatic contrast to the military pomp and ceremony
surrounding him in this former Japanese commercial building, one of the
few earthquake-proof and air-conditioned structures in Tokyo.
In a cigarette-smoking age, both MacArthur and Smith preferred the
calm comfort of a pipe. The commander in chief lit up and puffed
reflectively a moment. Then he leaned back in his chair and gave his
concept of the Inchon operation. But it was more than a concept in the
usual military sense; it was a vision of a victory potent enough to end
the Korean conflict at a stroke. And it was more than confidence which
upheld him; it was a supreme and almost mystical faith that he could
not fail.
He granted, of course, that there were difficulties and risks.
Evidently Almond had mentioned Smith’s reservations, for he proceeded
to reassure the Marine general. His voice full of feeling, he expressed
his deep conviction that the war could be won in a month at Inchon,
and that the 1st Marine Division could win it. The enemy, he explained,
had committed nearly all of his troops in the Pusan Perimeter. Thus the
Marines would not be heavily opposed when they stormed ashore at Inchon
and drove inland to cut the main NKPA line of communications at Seoul.
MacArthur said he knew that the Marines had high standards, having
commanded them in the New Britain operations of the last war. He
realized that the Marines strove for perfection, and the Inchon landing
was bound to be somewhat helter-skelter by the very nature of things.
But there was no doubt, he affirmed, that the victory soon to be gained
by the 1st Marine Division would make 15 September 1950 a glorious date
in American history.
His voice was charged with fervor as it rose and fell eloquently. Once
General Smith made a move as if to depart, but the commander in chief
motioned him back to his chair. At last he brought the conversation to
a close by standing suddenly, grasping the Marine general’s hand, and
bidding him a cordial good-bye.
_Conferences in Tokyo_
It was sometimes an awkward situation for Navy and Marine officers in
general, and Admiral Doyle and General Smith in particular. In many
respects they appeared doubters and pessimists in contrast to FECOM
staff officers who reflected General MacArthur’s shining confidence.
But as amphibious specialists, carrying a heavy load of responsibility
for the landing, they had to give serious thought to the risks at
Inchon.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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