On 8 October, ComNavFE directed Admiral Doyle and General Smith to effect his OpnPlan 113-50.[58] Coincidentally, the first contingents of the 5th Marines boarded the _Bayfield_ (1/5), _George Clymer_ (2/5), and _Bexar_ (3/5). Three days later, on the 11th, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray, commander of the reserve regiment, opened his CP in the _Bayfield_, and his unit completed embarkation.[59] [58] ComNavFE msg to ComPhibGruOne, CG 1stMarDiv and others, 0200 8 Oct 50. [59] 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035 11 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex QQ, appendix A (hereafter 1/5 _SAR_), 4, appendix B (hereafter 2/5 _SAR_), 6, and appendix C (hereafter 3/5 _SAR_), 4. Although reserve and administrative elements of the 1st and 7th Marines loaded earlier, the four assault battalions of these regiments could not begin embarkation until 13 October, owing to the fact that the LSTs had been used for shuttle service around Inchon Harbor. General Smith opened his CP in the _Mount McKinley_ at 1200 on the 11th.[60] The last of the landing ships were loaded by high tide on the morning of the 15th, and later that day all of them sailed for the objective. By evening of the 16th, most of the transports were on the way, but the _Mount McKinley_ and _Bayfield_ did not depart until the next day.[61] [60] CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 0752 11 Oct 50; Smith, _Notes_, 373. [61] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex RR (hereafter 7thMar _SAR_), 9; Smith, _Notes_, 399, 409; 1stMar _HD Oct 50_, 3. Broken down into seven embarkation groups, the landing force and X Corps troops leaving Inchon comprised a grand total of 1902 officers and 28,287 men. Of this number, 1461 officers and 23,938 men were on the rolls of the 1st Marine Division, the breakdown being as follows: Marine officers 1119 Marine enlisted 20,597 Navy officers 153 Navy enlisted 1002 U. S. Army & KMC officers attached 189 U. S. Army & KMC enlisted attached 2339[62] [62] 1stMarDiv _Embarkation Summary_, 16 Oct 50; and “Special Report 1stMarDiv,” 12. Even in the last stages of loading and during the actual departure, new orders had continued to flow out of higher headquarters. It will be recalled that General Smith issued his OpnO 16-50 for the Wonsan assault on 10 October. An alternate plan, to be executed on signal, went out to subordinate units the same day, providing for an administrative landing by the Division on RED Beach, north of Wonsan, instead of Kalma Peninsula.[63] [63] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 17-50_, 10 Oct 50.