U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
The Marine aviators might have found some consolation in the fact that
their comrades of the ground forces were also groping in a fog of
uncertainty. At the most critical period of the CCF thrust in the Wonju
area, General Smith was summoned to Taegu on 8 January for a conference
with General Ridgway. The Eighth Army commander proposed to attach one
of the Marine RCTs to X Corps in the Andong area, about 95 air miles
north of Masan. The remainder of the Division would then move to the
Pohang-Kyongju-Yongchon area, some 60 air miles northeast of Masan (Map
4).
Ridgway asked the Marine general to discuss the prospect with his
staff. He realized, he said, that no commander liked to have his
division split up, and he assured Smith that as soon as the X Corps
zone became stabilized, the RCT would be sent back to him.
They parted with this understanding, but a few hours after his return
by air to Masan the following message was received from Ridgway:
Subsequent your departure, alternate plan occurred to me on which
I would like your views soonest. It follows: 1st Mar Div, under
Army control, move without delay to general area outlined to you
personally today, to take over responsibility at date and hour
to be announced later for protection of MSR between Andong and
Kyongju, both inclusive, and prevent hostile penetration in force
south of Andong-Yongdok road.[34]
[34] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51, 4; EUSAK msg G-1-628-KGG, 8 Jan
51.
At 1115 on the 9th the plan was made official. An Eighth Army dispatch
ordered the 1st Marine Division to move without delay to the Pohang
area (Map 4), remaining under EUSAK control, with the following
missions:
(a) Prevent enemy penetrations in force south of the Andong-Yongdok
road;
(b) Protect the MSR connecting Pohang, Kyongju, Yongchon, Uihung, and
Uisong.[35]
[35] EUSAK msg GX-1-661-KG00, 9 Jan 51.
Based on these directives. Division OpnO 1-51 was issued at 1600 on the
9th. RCT-1 was directed to move by motor to Yongchon and to protect
the MSR, Yongchon-Uisong inclusive, from positions in the vicinity
of Yongchon and Uihung. The 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions,
plus other Division elements, were ordered to provide the required
trucks.[36]
[36] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 1-51, 9 Jan 51.
General Ridgway arrived at Masan by plane on the morning of 9 January.
He was met by General Smith and driven to Headquarters, where the
Division staff officers and regimental commanders were presented to
him. In a brief talk he reiterated the necessity for reconnaissance
and for regaining and maintaining contact with the enemy. The Marine
officers were told that limited offensive actions by Eighth Army units
would be put into effect soon.[37]
[37] Smith, _Notes_, 1279.
Division OpnO 2-51, issued at 1300 on the 10th, provided for the
completion of the Division movement by road and water from Masan to the
objective area.[38]
[38] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 2-51, 10 Jan 51.
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