case and liable to the most serious and fatal objections in another. He contended, therefore, that in every view the principle was in their favour, as well as the justice and imperious necessity of the case. The Learned Gentleman then referred to the authorities. He began by commenting on the passage which had been quoted from Sir George Mackenzie; which, he contended, the Lord Advocate had misunderstood, as it was quite evident, that George Mackenzie used the word “summonds” as synonymous with “indictment,” since an “accumulation of crimes,” the subject treated of, could not be predicated of a summons in the common acceptation of that term. And the doctrine laid down by this author was that an “accumulation of crimes is intended, either to læse the fame of the defender, or to distract him in his defence.” Now what did the Lord Advocate say in answer to this? He referred to a passage in Mr. Baron Hume’s work where that learned person says, that “the competency has never been disputed of charging in one libel any number of criminal acts, if they are all of one nature and species, or even of one class and general description.” But it was evident that the offences of which Mr. Hume spoke were of a different description from murder; for he expressly added the qualification, “so as to adhere in this point of view, and stamp a character on the pannel as one who is an habitual and irreclaimable offender in this sort,” (vol. ii. p. 166.) And accordingly the instances which he gave were of the crimes of theft and housebreaking; crimes which were susceptible of being aggravated by habit and repute, and of which the punishment might be restricted. But murder admitted of no such aggravation, and never was restricted. Hear, however, what Mr. Hume said in reference to those cases: “The Court, whenever they find that the immediate trial of such manifold changes is likely to prove oppressive, either to the witnesses, the Jury, or themselves; _and still more, if they see cause to believe that it may embarrass the pannel in his defence, or beget prejudices against him in the minds of the Jury_;--in any of these cases, they have it certainly in their power to divide or parcel out the libel, and proceed in the first instance to the trial of as many of the articles as may fitly be dispatched in a single diet, &c.” (vol. ii. p. 168.) The cases which occurred in 1696 might, however, be referred to in support of a contrary doctrine; but “if they are, I answer” said the Learned Counsel--“Are your Lordships prepared to do what was done in those cases? Are they to rule your Lordships’ decision in a case without any precedent whatsoever?” But even these did not bear on the present case; and none adverse to the principle had occurred since the year 1784. Even the case of 1784 itself was not opposed to the principle. _There_, there was connection. The case of Surridge and Dempster was mentioned as a case of two murders, as a case where more than one murder was