Dante. An essay. To which is added a translation of De Monarchia.
Dante Alighieri · en
From this let us argue: Justice is strongest in the world when it is
in one who is most willing and most powerful; only the Monarch is
this; therefore, only when Justice is in the Monarch is it strongest
in the world. This pro-syllogism goes on through the second figure,
with an involved negative, and is like this: All B is A; only C is A;
therefore only C is B: or all B is A; nothing but C is A; therefore
nothing but C is B.
Our previous explanation makes the first proposition apparent: the
second is proved thus, first in regard to will, and secondly in regard
to power. First it must be observed that the strongest opponent of
Justice is Appetite, as Aristotle intimates in the fifth book to
Nicomachus.[172] Remove Appetite altogether, and there remains nothing
adverse to Justice; and therefore it is the opinion of the Philosopher
that nothing should be left to the judge, if it can be decided by
law;[173] and this ought to be done for fear of Appetite, which easily
perverts men's minds. Where, then, there is nothing to be wished for,
there can be no Appetite, for the passions cannot exist if their
objects are destroyed. But the Monarch has nothing to desire, for his
jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean; and this is not the case
with other princes, whose kingdoms are bounded by those of their
neighbours; as, for instance, the kingdom of Castile is bounded by the
kingdom of Aragon. From which it follows that the Monarch is able to
be the purest embodiment of Justice among men.
[Footnote 172: _Eth._ v. 2.--(W.)]
[Footnote 173: _Rhetoric_, i. 1.--(W.)]
Further, as Appetite in some degree, however small, clouds the habit
of Justice, so does Charity, or rightly-directed affection, sharpen
and enlighten it. In whomsoever, therefore, rightly-directed affection
may chiefly dwell, in him may Justice best have place: and of this
sort is the Monarch. Therefore where a Monarch reigns Justice is, or
at least may be, strongest. That rightly-directed affections work as
we have said, we may see thus: Appetite, scorning[174] what in itself
belongs to man, seeks for other things outside him; but Charity sets
aside all else, and seeks God and man, and consequently the good of
man. And since of all the good things that men can have the greatest
is to live in peace (as we have already said), and as it is Justice
which most chiefly brings peace, therefore Charity will chiefly make
Justice strong, and the more so in proportion to its own strength.
[Footnote 174: "_Perseitas hominum_" = "_facultas per se
subsistendi_."--DUCANGE.]