Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
Because that which is implicit comes into existence, it certainly
passes into change, yet it remains one and the same, for the whole
process is dominated by it. The plant, for example, does not lose
itself in mere indefinite change. From the germ much is produced when
at first nothing was to be seen; but the whole of what is brought
forth, if not developed, is yet hidden and ideally contained within
itself. The principle of this projection into existence is that
the germ cannot remain merely implicit, but is impelled towards
development, since it presents the contradiction of being only implicit
and yet not desiring so to be. But this coming without itself has
an end in view; its completion fully reached, and its previously
determined end is the fruit or produce of the germ, which causes a
return to the first condition. The germ will produce itself alone and
manifest what is contained in it, so that it then may return to itself
once more thus to renew the unity from which it started. With nature it
certainly is true that the subject which commenced and the matter which
forms the end are two separate units, as in the case of seed and fruit.
The doubling process has apparently the effect of separating into two
things that which in content is the same. Thus in animal life the
parent and the young are different individuals although their nature is
the same.
In Mind it is otherwise: it is consciousness and therefore it is free,
uniting in itself the beginning and the end. As with the germ in
nature, Mind indeed resolves itself back into unity after constituting
itself another. But what is in itself becomes for Mind and thus
arrives at being for itself. The fruit and seed newly contained within
it on the other hand, do not become for the original germ, but for us
alone; in the case of Mind both factors not only are implicitly the
same in character, but there is a being for the other and at the same
time a being for self. That for which the “other” is, is the same
as that “other;” and thus alone Mind is at home with itself in its
“other.” The development of Mind lies in the fact that its going forth
and separation constitutes its coming to itself.