Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
This being-at-home-with-self, or coming-to-self of Mind may be
described as its complete and highest end: it is this alone that it
desires and nothing else. Everything that from eternity has happened
in heaven and earth, the life of God and all the deeds of time simply
are the struggles for Mind to know itself, to make itself objective
to itself, to find itself, be for itself, and finally unite itself to
itself; it is alienated and divided, but only so as to be able thus to
find itself and return to itself. Only in this manner does Mind attain
its freedom, for that is free which is not connected with or dependent
on another. True self-possession and satisfaction are only to be found
in this, and in nothing else but Thought does Mind attain this freedom.
In sense-perception, for instance, and in feeling, I find myself
confined and am not free; but I am free when I have a consciousness of
this my feeling. Man has particular ends and interests even in will; I
am free indeed when this is mine. Such ends, however, always contain
“another,” or something which constitutes for me “another,” such as
desire and impulse. It is in Thought alone that all foreign matter
disappears from view, and that Mind is absolutely free. All interest
which is contained in the Idea and in Philosophy is expressed in it.
b. _The Notion of the Concrete._
As to development, it may be asked, what does develop and what forms
the absolute content? Development is considered in the light of a
formal process in action and as destitute of content. But the act
has no other end but activity, and through this activity the general
character of the content is already fixed. For being-in-self and
being-for-self are the moments present in action; but the act is the
retention of these diverse elements within itself. The act thus is
really one, and it is just this unity of differences which is the
concrete. Not only is the act concrete, but also the implicit, which
stands to action in the relation of subject which begins, and finally
the product is just as concrete as the action or as the subject which
begins. Development in process likewise forms the content, the Idea
itself; for this we must have the one element and then the other: both
combined will form a unity as third, because the one in the other is
at home with, and not without, itself. Thus the Idea is in its content
concrete within itself, and this in two ways: first it is concrete
potentially, and then it is its interest that what is in itself should
be there for it.