The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_b_) And, further, we cannot more succinctly define the _absolute
Idea_, in the above use of the expression, than by saying it is
mind (Spirit): and we may add that the mind thus referred to is not
mind regarded as finite, that is, subject to the conditions and
limitations of sense-perception, but the universal and _absolute_
Intelligence[175], which, out of its own free activity, determines
Truth in the profoundest signification of the term. To the ordinary
consciousness of everyday life the object of perception, no doubt,
breaks away from mind, as though our thought stood in opposition
to Nature, which receives from us a validity equal at least to the
consciousness which perceives it. But in this way of looking at Nature
and the conscious subject as two neighbours set over against one
another in territories equally self-subsistent it is only the finite
and limited mind, not that which it is as an infinite substance and
in its notional truth, which is apprehended. Nature is not thus to
be set over against absolute Mind, either as conjoint with a sphere
of the Real of equal worth, or as an independent boundary thereto.
Rather the aspect which Nature appears to hold in this respect is
that which mind or spirit itself sets up, and of which it becomes
the product as a Nature in which limit and boundary are themselves
determining constituents. In fact, Mind in its absolute or infinite
substance can only be apprehended as this free activity, which is
manifested in self-development through differentiation. This object,
this _other_, through which such differentiation proceeds, is regarded
in such opposition as Nature, but as the object of intelligence it is
quite as much indebted to Mind for the free gift and fulness of its
own essential substance. We must therefore conceive Nature as herself
containing in potency the absolute Idea. She is that Idea in _apparent
shape_, which mind, in its synthetic power, posits as the object
opposed to itself. She is so far a product, a creation. The truth
of Nature therefore is simply the determination by mind of its own
substance, its ideality and power of determination, through a process
which no doubt begins with a separation of itself into two factors
which apparently negate each other, but which, by the very activity
of such negation and separation, passes beyond the contradiction
it implies to a unity which heals the fracture. Instead of finding
our-elves opposed to a limit and a barrier we have a totality in which
the parts which opposed each other are fused together by the free
universality of mind. This ideality, in other words this infinite
power of determination[176], is that which constitutes the profound
notion of Mind's _subjectivity._ As subjectivity mind is, in the first
instance, merely Nature, Mind, or Spirit that is _not explicitly_
unfolded, mind which has not arrived at the grasp of its true notion.
Nature is here set up in opposition to Mind, not as an object which