The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
In all these respects art is and remains for us, on the side, of its
highest possibilities, a thing of the past. Herein it has further lost
its genuine truth and life, and is rather transported to our world of
_ideas_ than is able to maintain its former necessity and its superior
place in reality. What is now stimulated in us by works of art is, in
addition to the fact of immediate enjoyment, our judgment. In other
words we subject the content, and the means of presentation of the
work of art, and the suitability and unsuitability of both, to the
contemplation of our thought. A _science_ of art is therefore a far
more urgent necessity in our own days than in times in which art as
art sufficed by itself alone to give complete satisfaction. We are
invited by art to contemplate it reflectively, not, that is to say,
with the object of recreating such art[12], but in order to ascertain
scientifically its nature.
In doing our best to accept such an invitation we are confronted with
the objection already adverted to, that even assuming that art is a
subject adapted for philosophical investigation in a general way, yet
it unquestionably is not so adapted to the systematic procedure of
science. Such an objection, however, implies to start with the false
notion that we can have a philosophical inquiry which is at the same
time unscientific. In reply to such a point I can only here state
summarily my opinion, that whatever ideas other people may have of
philosophy and philosophizing, I myself conceive philosophical inquiry
of any sort or kind to be inseparable from the methods of science. The
function of philosophy is to examine subject-matter in the light of the
principle of necessity, not, it is true, merely in accordance with its
subjective[13] necessity or external co-ordination, classification,
and so forth; it has rather to unfold and demonstrate the object under
review out of the necessity of its own intimate nature. Until this
essential process is made explicit the scientific quality of such an
inquiry is absent. In so far, however, as the objective necessity of
an object subsists essentially in its logical and metaphysical nature
the isolated examination of art may in such a case, at any rate, or
rather inevitably, must be carried forward with a certain relaxation
of scientific stringency. For art is based upon many assumptions, part
of which relate to its content, part to its material or conceptive[14]
medium, in virtue of which art is never far from the borders of
contingency and caprice. Consequently it is only relatively to the
essential and ideal progression of its content and its means of
expression that we are able to recall with advantage the formative
principle of its necessity[15].