The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
In tone music forsakes the element of external form and its sensuous
_visibility_, and requires for the apprehension of its results another
organ of sense, namely hearing, which, as also the sight, does not
belong to the senses of action but those y of contemplation; and is,
in fact, still more ideal than sight. For the unruffled, aesthetic
observation of works of art no doubt permits the objects to stand
out quietly in their freedom just as they are without any desire to
impair that effect in any way; but that which it apprehends is not
that which is itself essentially ideally composed[380], but rather
on the contrary, that which receives its consistency in its sensuous
existence. The ear, on the contrary, receives the result of that ideal
vibration of material substance[381], without placing itself in a
practical relation towards the objects, a result by means of which it
is no longer the material object in its repose, but the first example
of the more ideal activity of the soul itself which is apprehended. And
for the further reason that the negativity into which the oscillating
medium here enters is from one point of view an annihilation of the
spatial condition, which is itself removed by means of the reaction
of the body[382], the expression of this twofold negation, that is
tone, is a mode of externality which, in virtue of its very mode of
existence, is in its very origination self-destructive, and there and
then itself fundamentally disappears. And it is by virtue of this
twofold negation of externality, in which the root-principle of tone
consists, that the same corresponds to the ideal personal life; this
resonance which, in its essential explicitness[383], is something more
ideal than the subsistent corporeality in its independent reality, also
discloses this more ideal existence[384], and thereby offers a mode of
expression suited to the ideality of conscious life.
2. If we now, by a reverse process, inquire of what type this inner
life must be, if we are to prove it on its own account adapted to the
expression of sound and tones, we may recall the fact already observed
that by itself, that is, accepted as a real mode of objectivity, tone,
in contrast to the material of the plastic arts, is wholly abstract.
Stone and colour receive the forms of an extensive and varied world
of objects, and place them before us in their actual existence. Tones
are unable to do this. For musical expression therefore it is only
the inner life of soul that is wholly devoid of an object which is
appropriate, in other words, the abstract personal experience simply.
This is our entirely empty ego, the self without further content. The
fundamental task of music will therefore consist in giving a resonant
reflection, not to objectivity in its ordinary material sense, but to
the mode and modifications under which the most intimate self of the
soul, from the point of view of its subjective life and ideality, is
essentially moved.