The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
3. We may say the same of the _effect_ of music. The paramount claim
of that, too, is the direct contact with the most intimate ideality of
conscious life. It is more than any other the art of the soul, and is
immediately addressed to that. The art of painting, no doubt, as we
have observed, is able to express in physiognomy and facial traits with
other things the inner life and its activity, the moods and passions
of the heart, the situations, conflicts, and fatalities of the soul;
what, however, we have before us in pictures are objective appearances,
from which the self of contemplation, in its most ideal self-identity,
is still held distinctly apart. However much we become absorbed in or
penetrate into the object, the situation, the character, the forms
of a statue or a picture, admire a work of art, lose ourselves in or
possess ourselves with it, the fact still remains that these works of
art are and remain objects of independent subsistency, in respect to
which it is quite impossible for us to escape the relation of external
observation disappears. In music, however, this distinction disappears.
Its content is that which is itself essentially a part of our own
personal[385] life, and its expression does not result at the same
time in an objective mode of spatial _persistency_, but discloses, in
virtue of the continuity and freedom of its flight as it appears and
vanishes[386], that it is a manifestation, which, instead of possessing
itself an independent consistency, is dependent for its support on the
ideality of conscious life, and only can exist for that inward realm.
Tone is therefore no doubt a mode of both expression and externality;
but it is an expression which inevitably disappears precisely at the
point of and in virtue of becoming externality. At the very moment
that our organ of sense receives the sound it is gone. The impression
that should be given is at once transferred to the tablets of memory.
The tones merely resound in the depths of the soul, which are thereby
seized upon in their ideal substance, and suffused with emotion. This
ideality of content and mode of expression in the sense that it is
devoid of all external object defines the purely _formal_ aspect of
music. It has no doubt a content, but it is not a content such as we
mean when referring either to the plastic arts or poetry. What it
lacks is just this configuration of an objective other-to-itself,
whether we mean by such actual external phenomena, or the objectivity
of intellectual ideas and images. We may indicate the course of our
further examination as follows:
In the _first_ place we have to define more accurately the _general_
character of music and its effect in contradistinction to the other
arts, not merely from the point of view of its material, but also from
that of its form, which the spiritual content accepts.