4. If the middle term be not in both the premises determined to one and the same singular thing, no conclusion will follow, nor syllogism be made. For let the minor term be _man_, the middle term _living creature_, and the major term _lion_; and let the premises be, _man is a living creature_, _some living creature is a lion_, yet it will not follow that _every_ or _any man is a lion_. By which it is manifest, that in every syllogism, that proposition which has the middle term for its _subject_, ought to be either _universal_ or _singular_, but not _particular_ nor _indefinite_. For example, this syllogism, _every man is a living creature_, _some living creature is four-footed_, therefore _some man is four-footed_, is therefore faulty, because the middle term, _living creature_, is in the first of the premises determined only to _man_, for there the name of _living creature_ is given to man only, but in the latter premise it may be understood of some other living creature besides man. But if the latter premise had been _universal_, as here, _every man is a living creature_, _every living creature is a body_, therefore _every man is a body_, the syllogism had been true; for it would have followed that _body_ had been the name of _every living creature_, that is of _man_; that is to say, the conclusion _every man is a body_ had been true. Likewise, when the middle term is a _singular_ name, a syllogism may be made, I say a true syllogism, though useless in philosophy, as this, _some man is Socrates_, _Socrates is a philosopher_, therefore, _some man is a philosopher_; for the premises being granted, the conclusion cannot be denied. [Sidenote: From two particular propositions nothing can be concluded.] 5. And therefore of two premises, in both which the middle term is particular, a syllogism cannot be made; for whether the middle term be the _subject_ in both the premises, or the _predicate_ in both, or the _subject_ in one, and the _predicate_ in the other, it will not be necessarily determined to the same thing. For let the premises be, _Some man is blind_, In both which the middle _Some man is learned_, } term is the _subject_, it will not follow that _blind_ is the name of any _learned man_, or _learned_ the name of any _blind man_, seeing the name _learned_ does not contain the name _blind_, nor this that; and therefore it is not necessary that both should be names of the same man. So from these premises, _Every man is a living-creature_, } In both which the middle _Every horse is a living-creature_, } term is the _predicate_, nothing will follow. For seeing _living creature_ is in both of them _indefinite_, which is equivalent to _particular_, and that _man_ may be one kind of _living creature_, and _horse_ another kind, it is not necessary that _man_ should be the name of _horse_, or _horse_ of _man_. Or if the premises be,