The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 01 (of 11) — Thomas Hobbes — John Shaqi
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 01 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
1. Method and science defined.—2. It is more easily known concerning
singular, than universal things, that they are; and contrarily, it
is more easily known concerning universal, than singular things, why
they are, or what are their causes.—3. What it is philosophers seek
to know.—4. The first part, by which principles are found out, is
purely analytical.—5. The highest causes, and most universal in
every kind, are known by themselves.—6. Method from principles found
out, tending to science simply, what it is.—7. That method of civil
and natural science, which proceeds from sense to principles, is
analytical; and again, that, which begins at principles, is
synthetical.—8. The method of searching out, whether any thing
propounded be matter or accident.—9. The method of seeking whether
any accident be in this, or in that subject.—10. The method of
searching after the cause of any effect propounded.—11. Words serve
to invention, as marks; to demonstration, as signs.—12. The method
of demonstration is synthetical.—13. Definitions only are primary
and universal propositions.—14. The nature and definition of a
definition.—15. The properties of a definition.—16. The nature of a
demonstration.—17. The properties of a demonstration, and order of
things to be demonstrated.—18. The faults of a demonstration.—19.
Why the analytical method of geometricians cannot be treated of in
this place.
[Sidenote: Method and science defined.]
1. For the understanding of _method_, it will be necessary for me to
repeat the definition of philosophy, delivered above (Chap. I, art. 2.)
in this manner, _Philosophy is the knowledge we acquire, by true
ratiocination, of appearances, or apparent effects, from the knowledge
we have of some possible production or generation of the same; and of
such production, as has been or may be, from the knowledge we have of
the effects_. METHOD, therefore, in the study of philosophy, _is the
shortest way of finding out effects by their known causes, or of causes
by their known effects_. But we are then said to know any effect, when
we know _that there be causes of the same_, and _in what subject those
causes are_, and _in what subject they produce that effect_, and _in
what manner they work the same_. And this is the science of causes, or,
as they call it, of the διότι. All other science, which is called the
ὄτι, is either perception by sense, or the imagination, or memory
remaining after such perception.