The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 01 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
Sixthly, that no name can be defined by any one word; because no one
word is sufficient for the resolving of one or more words.
Seventhly, that a defined name ought not to be repeated in the
definition. For a defined name is the whole compound, and a definition
is the resolution of that compound into parts; but no total can be part
of itself.
[Sidenote: Nature of a demonstration.]
16. Any two definitions, that may be compounded into a syllogism,
produce a conclusion; which, because it is derived from principles, that
is, from definitions, is said to be demonstrated; and the derivation or
composition itself is called a demonstration. In like manner, if a
syllogism be made of two propositions, whereof one is a definition, the
other a demonstrated conclusion, or neither of them is a definition, but
both formerly demonstrated, that syllogism is also called a
demonstration, and so successively. The definition therefore of a
demonstration is this, _a demonstration is a syllogism, or series of
syllogisms, derived and continued, from the definitions of names, to the
last conclusion_. And from hence it may be understood, that all true
ratiocination, which taketh its beginning from true principles,
produceth science, and is true demonstration. For as for the original of
the name, although that, which the Greeks called ἀποδέιξις, and the
Latins _demonstratio_, was understood by them for that sort only of
ratiocination, in which, by the describing of certain lines and figures,
they placed the thing they were to prove, as it were before men's eyes,
which is properly ἀποδεικνύειν, or to _shew_ by the figure; yet they
seem to have done it for this reason, that unless it were in geometry,
(in which only there is place for such figures) there was no
ratiocination certain, and ending in science, their doctrines concerning
all other things being nothing but controversy and clamour; which,
nevertheless, happened, not because the truth to which they pretended
could not be made evident without figures, but because they wanted true
principles, from which they might derive their ratiocination; and,
therefore, there is no reason but that if true definitions were premised
in all sorts of doctrines, the demonstrations also would be true.
[Sidenote: Properties of a demonstration, and order of things to be
demonstrated.]
17. It. is proper to methodical demonstration,
First, that there be a true succession of one reason to another,
according to the rules of syllogizing delivered above.
Secondly, that the premises of all syllogisms be demonstrated from the
first definitions.