necessary for human society), that _five_ shall be the name of so many unities as are contained in two and three taken together, a man assent that this is therefore true, because two and three together are the same with five: this assent shall be called knowledge. And to know this truth is nothing else, but to acknowledge that it is made by ourselves. For by whose will and rules of speaking the number || is called two, ||| is called three, and ||||| is called five; by their will also it comes to pass that this proposition is true, _two and three taken together make five_. In like manner if we remember what it is that is called _theft_, and what _injury_; we shall understand by the words themselves, whether it be true that _theft is an injury_, or not. _Truth_ is the same with a _true proposition_; but _the proposition is true_ in which the _word consequent_, which by logicians is called _the predicate_, embraceth _the word antecedent_ in its amplitude, which they call _the subject_. And to _know truth_, is the same thing as to _remember_ that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words. Neither was it rashly nor unadvisedly said by Plato of old, _that knowledge was memory_. But it happens sometimes, that words although they have a certain and defined signification by constitution, yet by vulgar use either to adorn or deceive, they are so wrested from their own significations, that to remember the conceptions for which they were first imposed on things, is very hard, and not to be mastered but by a sharp judgment and very great diligence. It happens too that there are many words, which have no proper, determined, and everywhere the same signification; and are understood not by their own, but by virtue of other signs used together with them. Thirdly, there are some words of things unconceivable. Of those things, therefore, whereof they are the words, there is no conception; and therefore in vain do we seek for the truth of those propositions, which they make out of the words themselves. In these cases, while by considering the definitions of words we search out the truth of some proposition, according to the hope we have of finding it, we think it sometimes true, and sometimes false; either of which apart is called _thinking_, and also _believing_; both together, _doubting_. But when our reasons, for which we assent to some proposition, derive not from the _proposition itself_, but from the _person propounding_, whom we esteem so learned that he is not deceived, and we see no reason why he should deceive us; our assent, because it grows not from any confidence of our own, but from another man’s knowledge, is called _faith_. And by the confidence of whom we do believe, we are said _to trust them_, or _to trust in them_. By what hath been said, the difference appears, first, between _faith_ and _profession_; for that is always joined with inward assent; this not always. That is