The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 03 (of 11) — Thomas Hobbes — John Shaqi
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 03 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he
thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after
another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that
foresees what will become of a criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow
on the like crime before; having this order of thoughts, the crime, the
officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind of thoughts,
is called _foresight_, and _prudence_, or _providence_; and sometimes
_wisdom_; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing
all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much
one man has more experience of things past, than another, by so much
also he is more prudent, and his expectations the seldomer fail him. The
_present_ only has a being in nature; things _past_ have a being in the
memory only, but things _to come_ have no being at all; the _future_
being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past,
to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by
him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough. And though
it be called prudence, when the event answereth our expectation; yet in
its own nature, it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to
come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to
come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best
prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is
most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most
_signs_ to guess by.
[Sidenote: Signs.]
A _sign_ is the evident antecedent of the consequent; and contrarily,
the consequent of the antecedent, when the like consequences have been
observed, before: and the oftener they have been observed, the less
uncertain is the sign. And therefore he that has most experience in any
kind of business, has most signs, whereby to guess at the future time;
and consequently is the most prudent: and so much more prudent than he
that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any
advantage of natural and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men
think the contrary.
Nevertheless it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.
There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which
is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.
[Sidenote: Conjecture of the time past.]
As prudence is a _presumption_ of the _future_, contracted from the
_experience_ of time _past_: so there is a presumption of things past
taken from other things, not future, but past also. For he that hath
seen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come
into civil war, and then to ruin; upon the sight of the ruins of any
other state, will guess, the like war, and the like courses have been
there also. But this conjecture, has the same uncertainty almost with
the conjecture of the future; both being grounded only upon experience.