But this privilege is allayed by another; and that is, by the privilege of absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry; whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable. [Sidenote: Causes of absurdity.] I. The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of method; in that they begin not their ratiocination from definitions; that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numeral words, _one_, _two_, and _three_. And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter; these considerations being diversely named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore, II. The second cause of absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of _bodies_ to _accidents_; or of _accidents_ to _bodies_; as they do, that say, _faith is infused_, or _inspired_; when nothing can be _poured_, or _breathed_ into anything, but body; and that, _extension_ is _body_; that _phantasms_ are _spirits_, &c. III. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the _accidents_ of _bodies without us_, to the _accidents_ of our _own bodies_; as they do that say, the _colour is in the body_; _the sound is in the air_, &c. IV. The fourth, to the giving of the names of _bodies_ to _names_, or _speeches_; as they do that say, that _there be things universal_; that _a living creature is genus_, or _a general thing_, &c. V. The fifth, to the giving of the names of _accidents_ to _names_ and _speeches_; as they do that say, _the nature of a thing is its definition_; _a man’s command is his will_; and the like. VI. The sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. For though it be lawful to say, for example, in common speech, _the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither_; _the proverb says this or that_, whereas ways cannot go, nor proverbs speak; yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted. VII. The seventh, to names that signify nothing; but are taken up, and learned by rote from the schools, as _hypostatical_, _transubstantiate_, _consubstantiate_, _eternal-now_, and the like canting of schoolmen.