The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 03 (of 11) — Thomas Hobbes — John Shaqi
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 03 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
To him that can avoid these things it is not easy to fall into any
absurdity, unless it be by the length of an account; wherein he may
perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and
well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to
mistake in geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his
error to him?
[Sidenote: Science.]
By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with
us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by
industry; first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good
and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to
assertions made by connexion of one of them to another; and so to
syllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till
we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to
the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas sense
and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and
irrevocable. _Science_ is the knowledge of consequences, and dependance
of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we
know how to do something else when we will, or the like another time;
because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by
what manner; when the like causes come into our power, we see how to
make it produce the like effects.
Children therefore are not endued with reason at all, till they have
attained the use of speech; but are called reasonable creatures, for the
possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come. And
the most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little
way, as in numbering to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in
common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse,
according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and
inclinations to several ends; but specially according to good or evil
fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for _science_, or certain
rules of their actions, they are so far from it, that they know not what
it is. Geometry they have thought conjuring: but for other sciences,
they who have not been taught the beginnings and some progress in them,
that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point
like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by
the women that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the
garden.
But yet they that have no _science_, are in better, and nobler
condition, with their natural prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning,
or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd
general rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men
so far out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for
causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes
of the contrary.