The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 03 (of 11) — Thomas Hobbes — John Shaqi
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 03 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
No discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or
to come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and
ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have
said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No
man can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be;
which is to know absolutely: but only, that if this be, that is; if this
has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be: which is to
know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to
another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.
[Sidenote: Science.]
And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with
the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into
general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms; the end or
last sum is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it
signified, is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the
consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE. [Sidenote:
Opinion.] But if the first ground of such discourse, be not definitions;
or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms,
then the end or conclusion, is again OPINION, namely of the truth of
somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without
possibility of being understood. [Sidenote: Conscious.] When two, or
more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS
of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And
because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a
third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very evil act, for any man to
speak against his _conscience_: or to corrupt or force another so to do:
insomuch that the plea of conscience, has been always hearkened unto
very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word
metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret
thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said, that the conscience is
a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with
their own new opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to
maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of
conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak
against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at
most, but that they think so.