When a man’s discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as the person; [Sidenote: Belief. Faith.] and the resolution is called BELIEF, and FAITH: _faith_, _in_ the man; _belief_, both _of_ the man, and _of_ the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his virtue. To _have faith in_, or _trust to_, or _believe a man_, signify the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: but to _believe what is said_, signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to observe that this phrase, _I believe in_; as also the Latin, _credo in_; and the Greek, πιστέυω ἐις, are never used but in the writings of divines. Instead of them, in other writings are put, _I believe him_; _I trust him_; _I have faith in him_; _I rely on him_: and in Latin, _credo illi_: _fido illi_: and in Greek, πιστέυω αὐτω: and that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith. But by _believing in_, as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the person; but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they hear him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed.