These _virtues_ are of two sorts; _natural_, and _acquired_. By natural, I mean not, that which a man hath from his birth: for that is nothing else but sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues. [Sidenote: Natural wit.] But I mean, that _wit_, which is gotten by use only, and experience; without method, culture, or instruction. This NATURAL WIT, consisteth principally in two things; _celerity of imagining_, that is, swift succession of one thought to another; and _steady direction_ to some approved end. On the contrary a slow imagination, maketh that defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called DULLNESS, _stupidity_, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion, or difficulty to be moved. [Sidenote: Good wit, or fancy.] And this difference of quickness, is caused by the difference of men’s passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore some men’s thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to, and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination. And whereas in this succession of men’s thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be _like one another_, or in what they be _unlike_, or _what they serve for_, or _how they serve to such a purpose_; those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are said to have a _good wit_; by which, in this occasion, is meant a _good fancy_. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called _distinguishing_, and _discerning_, [Sidenote: Good judgment.] and _judging_ between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easy, are said to have a _good judgment_: and particularly in matter of conversation and business; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be discerned, [Sidenote: Discretion.] this virtue is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, fancy, without the help of judgment, is not commended as a virtue: but the latter which is judgment, and discretion, is commended for itself, without the help of fancy. Besides the discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their end; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this virtue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not only by illustrations of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity of their invention. But without steadiness, and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness; such as they have, that entering into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: which kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is,