1. It hath been declared already, how _external_ objects cause _conceptions_, and conceptions, _appetite_ and _fear_, which are the _first unperceived beginnings of our actions_: for _either_ the actions immediately follow the first appetite, as when we do anything upon a sudden; _or else_ to our first appetite there succeedeth some conception of evil to happen to us by such actions, which is fear, and which holdeth us from proceeding. And to that fear may succeed a new appetite, and to that appetite another fear alternately, till the action be either done, or some accident come between, to make it impossible; and so this alternate appetite and fear ceaseth. This _alternate succession of appetite and fear_ during all the time the action is in our power to do or not to do, is that we call _deliberation_; which name hath been given it for that part of the definition wherein it is said that it lasteth so long as the action, whereof we deliberate, is in our power: for, so long we have liberty to do or not to do; and deliberation signifieth a taking away of our own liberty. 2. _Deliberation_ therefore requireth in the action deliberated _two conditions_; one, that it be _future_; the other, that there be _hope_ of doing it, or possibility of not doing it; for, _appetite_ and _fear_ are _expectations_ of the future; and there is no expectation of good, without hope; or of evil, without possibility: of _necessaries_ therefore there is _no deliberation_. In deliberation, the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called _will_, viz. the last appetite, will to do, or will to omit. It is all one therefore to say _will_ and _last will_: for, though a man express his present inclination and appetite concerning the disposing of his goods, by words or writings; yet shall it not be counted his will, because he hath still liberty to dispose of them otherways: but when death taketh away that liberty, then it is his will. 3. _Voluntary_ actions and omissions are such as have beginning in the _will_; all other are _involuntary_, or _mixed voluntary_; _involuntary_, such as he doth by necessity of nature, as when he is pushed, or falleth, and thereby doth good or hurt to another: _mixed_, such as participate of both; as when a man is carried to prison, going is voluntary, to the prison, is involuntary: the example of him that throweth his goods out of a ship into the sea, to save his person, is of an action altogether voluntary: for, there is nothing therein involuntary, but the hardness of the choice, which is not his action, but the action of the winds: what he himself doth, is no more against his will, than to flee from danger is against the will of him that seeth no other means to preserve himself.