3. When a man divesteth and putteth from himself his right, he either simply relinquisheth it, or transferreth the same to another man. To _relinquish_ it, is by sufficient signs to declare, that it is his will no more to do that action, which of right he might have done before. To _transfer_ right to another, is by sufficient signs to declare to that other accepting thereof, that it is his will not to resist, or hinder him, according to that right he had thereto before he transferred it. For seeing that by nature every man hath right to every thing, it is impossible for a man to transfer unto another any right that he had not before. And therefore all that a man doth in transferring of right, is no more but a declaring of the will, to suffer him, to whom he hath so transferred his right, to make benefit of the same, without molestation. As for example, when a man giveth his lands or goods to another, he taketh from himself the right to enter into, and make use of the said lands or goods, or otherwise to hinder him of the use of what he hath given. [Sidenote: The will to transfer, and the will to accept, both necessary to the passing away of right.] 4. In transferring of right, two things therefore are required: one on the part of him that transferreth, which is a sufficient signification of his will therein; the other, on the part of him to whom it is transferred, which is a sufficient signification of his acceptation thereof. Either of these failing, the right remaineth where it was: nor is it to be supposed, that he which giveth his right to one that accepteth it not, doth thereby simply relinquish it, and transfer it to whomsoever will receive it: inasmuch as the cause of transferring the same to one, rather than to another, is in the one, rather than in the rest. [Sidenote: Right not transferred by words _de futuro_ only.] 5. When there appear no other signs that a man hath relinquished, or transferred his right, but only words, it behoveth that the same be done in words, that signify the present time, or the time past, and not only the time to come. For he that saith of the time to come, as for example, to-morrow I will give, declareth evidently, that he hath not yet given. The right, therefore, remaineth in him to-day, and so continues, till he have given actually. But he that saith, I give, presently, or have given to another anything, to have and enjoy the same to-morrow, or any other time further, hath now actually transferred the said right, which otherwise he should have had at the time that the other is to enjoy it. [Sidenote: Words _de futuro_, together with other signs of the will, may transfer right.]