“Concerning praise and dispraise, he enlargeth himself. The scope of his discourse is, that ‘things necessary may be praiseworthy.’ There is no doubt of it; but withal their praise reflects upon the free agent, as the praise of a statue reflects upon the workman who made it. ‘To praise a thing,’ saith he, ‘is to say it is good.’ (_n_) True, but this goodness is not a metaphysical goodness; so the worst of things, and whatsoever hath a being, is good: nor a natural goodness; the praise of it passeth wholly to the Author of nature; _God saw all that he had made, and it was very good_: but a moral goodness, or a goodness of actions rather than of things. The moral goodness of an action is the conformity of it with right reason. The moral evil of an action is the deformity of it, and the alienation of it from right reason. It is moral praise and dispraise which we speak of here. To praise anything morally, is to say, it is morally good, that is, conformable to right reason. The moral dispraise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disagreeing from the rule of right reason. So moral praise is from the good use of liberty, moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty; but if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is quite taken away, and with it all true praise and dispraise. Whereas T. H. adds, that ‘to say a thing is good, is to say, it is as I would wish, or as another would wish, or as the state would have it, or according to the law of the land;’ he mistakes infinitely. He, and another, and the state, may all wish that which is not really good, but only in appearance. We do often wish what is profitable or delightful, without regarding so much as we ought what is honest. And though the will of the state where we live, or the law of the land, do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infallible rule of moral goodness. And therefore to his question, ‘whether nothing that proceeds from necessity can please me,’ I answer, yes. The burning of the fire pleaseth me, when I am cold; and I say, it is good fire, or a creature created by God for my use and for my good. Yet I do not mean to attribute any moral goodness to the fire, nor give any moral praise to it, as if it were in the power of the fire itself either to communicate its heat or to suspend it; but I praise first the Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. As for the praise which Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, that he was good by nature, _et quia aliter esse non potuit_; it hath more of the orator, than either of the theologian or philosopher in it. Man in the state of innocency did fall and become evil; what privilege hath Cato more than he? No, by his leave. _Narratur et divi Catonis sæpe mero caluisse virtus._ But the true meaning is, that he was naturally of a good temper, not so prone to some kinds of vice as others were. This is to praise a thing, not an action, naturally, not morally. Socrates was not of so good a natural temper,