_T. H._ The fourth argument from reason, is this. The order, beauty, and perfection of the world requireth that in the universe there should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make all things necessary, or all things free, or all things contingent, doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world. In which argument I observe, first, a contradiction. For seeing he that maketh anything, in that he maketh it, he maketh it to be necessary, it followeth, that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessary to be. As if a workman make a garment, the garment must necessarily be. So if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth, though we know it not, that some agents should work without deliberation, which he calls necessary agents; and some agents with deliberation, and those both he and I call free agents; and that some agents should work, and we not know how; and those effects we both call contingent. But this hinders not, but that he that electeth, may have his election necessarily determined to one by former causes; and that which is contingent, and imputed to fortune, be nevertheless necessary, and depend on precedent necessary causes. For by contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but which hath not for cause any thing which we perceive. As for example; when a traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause, sufficient enough to produce it; but because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say, they were contingent one to another. And thus you see, though there be three sorts of events, necessary, contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary, without the destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe.