(_b_) “Wherefore this kind of actions are called mixed actions, that is partly voluntary, partly involuntary, &c. So supposing a man were not in that distress, they are involuntary.” That some actions are partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is not a new, but a false opinion. For one and the same action can never be both voluntary and involuntary. If therefore parts of an action be actions, he says no more but that some actions are voluntary, some involuntary; or that one multitude of actions may be partly voluntary, partly involuntary. But that one action should be partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is absurd. And it is the absurdity of those authors which he unwarily gave credit to. But to say, supposing the man had not been in distress, that then the action had been involuntary, is to say, that the throwing of a man’s goods into the sea, supposing he had not been in a storm, had been an involuntary action; which is also an absurdity; for he would not have done it, and therefore it had been no action at all. And this absurdity is his own. (_c_) “His other instance of a man forced to prison, that he may choose whether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his feet, is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their power.” It is enough for the use I make of that instance, that a man when in the necessity of going to prison, though he cannot elect nor deliberate of being prisoner in the jail, may nevertheless deliberate sometimes, whether he shall walk or be haled thither.