The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11) — Thomas Hobbes — John Shaqi
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
the inconveniences of them may be represented to a man, by the help of
his senses; but how reason representeth anything to the will, I
understand no more than the Bishop understands how there may be liberty
in children, in beasts, and inanimate creatures. For he seemeth to
wonder how children may be left at liberty; how beasts in prison may be
set at liberty; and how a river may have a free course; and saith,
“What! will he ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures, also?” And thus
he thinks he hath made it clear how _necessity_, _spontaneity_, and
_liberty_ differ from one another. If the reader find it so, I am
contented.
(_b_) “His necessity is just such another; a necessity upon supposition,
arising from the concourse of all the causes, including the last dictate
of the understanding in reasonable creatures,” &c.
The Bishop might easily have seen, that the necessity I hold, is the
same necessity that he denies; namely, a necessity of things future,
that is, an antecedent necessity derived from the very beginning of
time; and that I put necessity for an impossibility of not being, and
that impossibility as well as possibility are never truly said but of
the future. I know as well as he that the cause, when it is adequate, as
he calleth it, or entire, as I call it, is together in time with the
effect. But for all that, the necessity may be and is before the effect,
as much as any necessity can be. And though he call it a necessity of
supposition, it is no more so than all other necessity is. The fire
burneth necessarily; but not without supposition that there is fuel put
to it. And it burneth the fuel, when it is put to it, necessarily; but
it is by supposition, that the ordinary course of nature is not
hindered; for the fire burnt not the three children in the furnace.
(_c_) “But if these causes did operate freely or contingently, if they
might have suspended or denied their concurrence, or have concurred
after another manner, then the effect was not truly and antecedently
necessary, but either free or contingent.”