(_k_) “So my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was extrinsically and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse, without any concurrence of mine in the determination, and without any power in me to change or oppose it, or I was not so predetermined. If I was, then I ought not to be blamed, for no man is justly blamed for doing that which never was in his power to shun. If I was not so predetermined, then mine actions and my will to act, are neither compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsical causes, but I elect and choose, either to write or to forbear, according to mine own will and by mine own power. And when I have resolved and elected, it is but a necessity of supposition, which may and doth consist with true liberty, not a real antecedent necessity. The two horns of this dilemma are so straight, that no mean can be given, nor room to pass between them. And the two consequences are so evident, that instead of answering he is forced to decline them. ANIMADVERSIONS UPON HIS REPLY NO. III. (_a_) “Thus much I will maintain, that this is no true necessity, which he calleth necessity; nor that liberty which he calleth liberty; nor that the question, which he makes the question,” &c. “For the clearing whereof, it behoveth us to know the difference between these three, _necessity_, _spontaneity_, and _liberty_.” I did expect, that for the knowing of the difference between _necessity_, _spontaneity_, and _liberty_, he would have set down their definitions. For without these, their difference cannot possibly appear. For how can a man know how things differ, unless he first know what they are? which he offers not to shew. He tells us that _necessity_ and _spontaneity_ may meet together, and _spontaneity_ and _liberty_; but _necessity_ and _liberty_ never; and many other things impertinent to the purpose. For which, because of the length, I refer the reader to the place. I note only this, that _spontaneity_ is a word not used in common English; and they that understand Latin, know it means no more than _appetite_, or _will_, and is not found but in living creatures. And seeing, he saith, that _necessity_ and _spontaneity_ may stand together, I may say also, that _necessity_ and _will_ may stand together, and then is not the will free, as he would have it, from necessitation. There are many other things in that which followeth, which I had rather the reader would consider in his own words, to which I refer him, than that I should give him greater trouble in reciting them again. For I do not fear it will be thought too hot for my fingers, to shew the vanity of such words as these, _intellectual appetite_, _conformity of the appetite to the object_, _rational will_, _elective power of the rational will_; nor understand I how reason can be the root of true liberty, if the Bishop, as he saith in the beginning, had the liberty to write this discourse. I understand how objects, and the conveniences and