The question in general is stated by the Bishop himself, (towards the end of No. III.), in these words: “Whether all events, natural, civil, moral, (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsically and inevitably, without their own concurrence; so as all the actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise after any other manner or in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end than they are. And all this in respect of the supreme cause, or a concourse of extrinsical causes, determining them to one.” Which though drawn up to his advantage, with as much caution as he would do a lease, yet (excepting that which is not intelligible) I am content to admit. Not intelligible is, first, “that the conversion of a sinner concerns not the question.” If he mean, that the conversion of a sinner is from necessity, and predetermined, then he is, for so much as the question concerns religion, of the same mind that I am; and what he can mean else by that exception, I cannot guess. Secondly, these words, “without their own concurrence,” are insignificant, unless he mean that the events themselves should concur to their production: as that fire doth not necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning, as the words properly import: or at least without concurrence of the fuel. Those two clauses left out, I agree with him in the state of the question as it is put universally. But when the question is put of the necessity of any particular event, as of the will to write, or the like, then it is the stating of that particular question: but it is decided in the decision of the question universal. He states the same question again in another place thus: “This is the very question where the water sticks between us, whether there be such a liberty free from necessitation and extrinsical determination to one, or not.” And I allow it also for well stated so. Again he says, “In a word, so great difference there is between natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this question.” So that the state of the question is reduced to this, “Whether there be a moral efficacy which is not natural?” I say there is not: he says there is. Again he writes thus: “And therefore as it were ridiculous to say, that the object of sight is the cause of seeing; so it is to say, that the proposing of the object by the understanding to the will, is the cause of willing.” Here also the question is brought to this issue, “Whether the object of sight be the cause that it is seen?” But for these words, “proposing of the object by the understanding to the will,” I understand them not.