The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11) — Thomas Hobbes — John Shaqi
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
Again, he often useth such words as these: “The will willeth; the will
suspendeth its act, (_Rid est_, the will willeth not); the understanding
proposeth; the understanding understandeth.” Herein also lyeth the whole
question. If they be true, I, if false, he is in error.
Again, the whole question is decided, when this is decided, “Whether he
that willingly permitteth a thing to be done, when without labour,
danger, or diversion of mind, he might have hindered it, do not will the
doing of it?”
Again the whole question of free-will is included in this, “Whether the
will determine itself?”
Again, it is included in this, “Whether there be an universal grace,
which particular men can take without a particular grace to take it?”
Lastly, there be two questions; one, “Whether a man be free in such
things as are within his power, to do what he will;” another, “Whether
he be free to will.” Which is as much as to say (because will is
appetite), it is one question, whether he be free to eat that has an
appetite, and another, whether he be free to have an appetite? In the
former, “whether a man be free to do what he will,” I agree with the
Bishop. In the latter, “whether he be free to will,” I dissent from him.
And, therefore, all the places of Scripture that he allegeth to prove
that a man hath liberty to do what he will, are impertinent to the
question. If he has not been able to distinguish between these two
questions, he has not done well to meddle with either: if he has
understood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if
he will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with his readers. And
thus much for the state of the question.
-------
THE FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENT IN THIS QUESTION.
The arguments by which this question is disputed, are drawn from four
fountains. 1. From _authorities_. 2. From _the inconveniences consequent
to either opinion_. 3. From _the attributes of God_. 4. From _natural
reason_.
The _authorities_ are of two sorts, _divine_ and _human_. _Divine_ are
those which are taken from the holy Scriptures. _Human_ also are of two
sorts; one, the authorities of those men that are generally esteemed to
have been learned, especially in this question, as the Fathers,
Schoolmen, and old Philosophers: the other, are the vulgar and most
commonly received opinions in the world.
His reasons and places of Scripture I will answer the best I am able;
but his human authorities I shall admit and receive as far as to
Scripture and reason they be consonant, and no further.