“His first instance is in the horse, or dog, but more especially the horse. He told me that I divided my argument into squadrons, to apply myself to your Lordship, being a military man; and I apprehend that for the same reason he gives his first instance of the horse, with a submission to your own experience. So far well, but otherwise very disadvantageously to his cause. Men used to say of a dull fellow, that he hath no more brains than a horse. And the Prophet David saith, (Psalm xxxii. 9): _Be not like the horse and mule, which have no understanding_. How do they deliberate without understanding? And (Psalm xlix. 20), he saith the same of all brute beasts: _Man being in honour had no understanding, but became like unto the beasts that perish_. The horse ‘demurs upon his way.’ Why not? Outward objects, or inward fancies, may produce a stay in his course, though he have no judgment either to deliberate or elect. ‘He retires from some strange figure which he sees, and comes on again to avoid the spur.’ So he may; and yet be far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds from the sensitive passion of fear, which is a perturbation arising from the expectation of some imminent evil. But he urgeth, ‘what else doth a man that deliberateth?’ Yes, very much. The horse feareth some outward object, but deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same end. Fear is commonly of one, deliberation of more than one; fear is of those things which are not in our power, deliberation of those things which are in our power; fear ariseth many times out of natural antipathies, but in these disconveniences of nature deliberation hath no place at all. In a word, fear is an enemy to deliberation, and betrayeth the succours of the soul. If the horse did deliberate, he should consult with reason, whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or not; he would represent to himself all the dangers both of going and staying, and compare the one with the other, and elect that which is less evil; he should consider whether it were not better to endure a little hazard, than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty towards his master, who did breed him and doth feed him. This the horse doth not; neither is it possible for him to do it. Secondly, for children, T. H. confesseth that they may be so young that they do not deliberate at all; afterwards, as they attain to the use of reason by degrees, so by degrees they become free agents. Then they do deliberate; before they do not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make them use their reason, when they have power to exercise it, but the rod cannot produce the power before they have it. Thirdly, for fools and madmen, it is not to be understood of such madmen as have their _lucida intervalla_, who are mad and discreet by fits; when they have the use of reason, they are no madmen, but may deliberate as well as others; nor yet of such fools as are only comparative fools, that is, less wise than