I resolve to have no more to do with spontaneity. But I desire the reader to take notice, that the common people, on whose arbitration dependeth the signification of words in common use, among the Latins and Greeks did call all actions and motions whereof they did perceive no cause, spontaneous and αυτοματα: I say, not those actions which had no causes; for all actions have their causes; but those actions whose causes they did not perceive. So that spontaneous, as a general name, comprehended many actions and motions of inanimate creatures; as the falling of heavy things downwards, which they thought spontaneous, and that if they were not hindered, they would descend of their _own accord_. It comprehended also all animal motion, as beginning from the will or appetite; because the causes of the will and appetite being not perceived, they supposed, as the Bishop doth, that they were the causes of themselves. So that which in general is called spontaneous, being applied to men and beasts in special, is called voluntary. Yet the will and appetite, though the very same thing, use to be distinguished in certain occasions. For in the public conversation of men, where they are to judge of one another’s will, and of the regularity and irregularity of one another’s actions, not every appetite, but the last is esteemed in the public judgment for the will: nor every action proceeding from appetite, but that only to which there had preceded or ought to have preceded some deliberation. And this I say is so, when one man is to judge of another’s will. For every man in himself knoweth that what he desireth or hath an appetite to, the same he hath a will to, though his will may be changed before he hath obtained his desire. The Bishop, understanding nothing of this, might, if it had pleased him, have called it jargon. But he had rather pick out of it some contradictions of myself. And therefore saith: (_d_) “Yet I have no reason to be offended at it, (meaning such contradictions), for he dealeth no otherwise with me than he doth with himself.” It is a contradiction, he saith, that having said that “voluntary presupposeth deliberation,” I say in another place, “that whatsoever followeth the last appetite, is voluntary, and where there is but one appetite, that is the last.” Not observing that _voluntary_ presupposeth _deliberation_, when the judgment, whether the action be voluntary or not, is not in the actor, but in the judge; who regardeth not the will of the actor, where there is nothing to be accused in the action of deliberate malice; yet knoweth that though there be but one appetite, the same is truly will for the time, and the action, if it follow, a voluntary action. This also he saith is a contradiction, that having said, “no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden,” I say afterward that “by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding.”