its act is taken away from the will, but not so where the determination is moral. In the former case, the will is determined extrinsically, in the latter case intrinsically; the former produceth an absolute necessity, the latter only a necessity of supposition. If the will do not suspend, but assent, then the act is necessary; but because the will may suspend, and not assent, therefore it is not absolutely necessary. In the former case, the will is moved necessarily and determinately; in the latter, freely and indeterminately. The former excitation is immediate; the latter is mediate _mediante intellectu_, and requires the help of the understanding. In a word, so great a difference there is between natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this question. “There remains only the last dictate of the understanding, which he maketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the determination of the will, and to the necessary production of the act, ‘as the last feather may be said to break an horse’s back, when there were so many laid on before that there wanted but that to do it.’ I have shewed (No. VII.) that the last dictate of the understanding is not always absolute in itself, nor conclusive to the will; and when it is conclusive, yet it produceth no antecedent nor extrinsical necessity. I shall only add one thing more at present, that by making the last judgment of right reason to be of no more weight than a single feather, he wrongs the understanding as well as he doth the will; and endeavours to deprive the will of its supreme power of application, and to deprive the understanding of its supreme power of judicature and definition. Neither corporeal agents and objects, nor yet the sensitive appetite itself, being an inferior faculty and affixed to the organ of the body, have any direct or immediate dominion or command over the rational will. It is without the sphere of their activity. All the access which they have unto the will, is by the means of the understanding, sometimes clear and sometimes disturbed, and of reason, either right or misinformed. Without the help of the understanding, all his second causes were not able of themselves to load the horse’s back with so much weight as the least of all his feathers doth amount unto. But we shall meet with his horseload of feathers again, No. XXIII. “These things being thus briefly touched, he proceeds to his answer. My argument was this: if any of these or all these causes formerly recited, do take away true liberty, (that is, still intended from necessity), then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. “But Adam before his fall had true liberty.