“He mis-recites the argument, and denies the consequence, which is so clearly proved, that no man living can doubt of it. Because Adam was subjected to all the same causes as well as we, the same decree, the same prescience, the same influences, the same concourse of causes, the same efficacy of objects, the same dictates of reason. But it is only a mistake; for it appears plainly by his following discourse, that he intended to deny, not the consequence, but the assumption. For he makes Adam to have had no liberty from necessity before his fall, yea, he proceeds so far as to affirm that all human wills, his and ours, and each propension of our wills, even during our deliberation, are as much necessitated as anything else whatsoever; that we have no more power to forbear those actions which we do, than the fire hath power not to burn. Though I honour T. H. for his person and for his learning, yet I must confess ingenuously, I hate this doctrine from my heart. And I believe both I have reason so to do, and all others who shall seriously ponder the horrid consequences which flow from it. It destroys liberty, and dishonours the nature of man. It makes the second causes and outward objects to be the rackets, and men to be but the tennis-balls of destiny. It makes the first cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the introducer of all evil and sin into the world, as much as man, yea, more than man, by as much as the motion of the watch is more from the artificer, who did make it and wind it up, than either from the spring, or the wheels, or the thread, if God, by his special influence into the second causes, did necessitate them to operate as they did. And if they, being thus determined, did necessitate Adam inevitably, irresistibly, not by an accidental, but by an essential subordination of causes to whatsoever he did, then one of these two absurdities must needs follow: either that Adam did not sin, and that there is no such thing as sin in the world, because it proceeds naturally, necessarily, and essentially from God; or that God is more guilty of it, and more the cause of evil than man, because man is extrinsically, inevitably determined, but so is not God. And in causes essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause is always the cause of the effect. What tyrant did ever impose laws that were impossible for those to keep, upon whom they were imposed, and punish them for breaking those laws, which he himself had necessitated them to break, which it was no more in their power not to break, than it is in the power of the fire not to burn? Excuse me if I hate this doctrine with a perfect hatred, which is so dishonourable both to God and man; which makes men to blaspheme of necessity, to steal of necessity, to be hanged of necessity, and to be damned of necessity. And therefore I must say and say again, _quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incredulus odi_. It were better to be an atheist, to believe no God; or