A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
This example is worthy of consideration also in another respect. Though
the causes themselves are permanent, and independent of all conditions
known to us, the changes which take place in the quantities and
relations of the causes are actually caused by the periodical changes in
the effects. The causes, as they exist at any moment, having produced a
certain motion, that motion, becoming itself a cause, reacts upon the
causes, and produces a change in them. By altering the distance and
direction of the central body relatively to the planet, and the
direction and quantity of the force in the direction of the tangent, it
alters the elements which determine the motion at the next succeeding
instant. This change renders the next motion somewhat different; and
this difference, by a fresh reaction upon the causes, renders the next
motion again different, and so on. The original state of the causes
might have been such, that this series of actions modified by reactions
would not have been periodical. The sun's action, and the original
impelling force, might have been in such a ratio to one another, that
the reaction of the effect would have been such as to alter the causes
more and more, without ever bringing them back to what they were at any
former time. The planet would then have moved in a parabola, or an
hyperbola, curves not returning into themselves. The quantities of the
two forces were, however, originally such, that the successive reactions
of the effect bring back the causes, after a certain time, to what they
were before; and from that time all the variations continue to recur
again and again in the same periodical order, and must so continue
while the causes subsist and are not counteracted.
§ 3. In all cases of progressive effects, whether arising from the
accumulation of unchanging or of changing elements, there is an
uniformity of succession not merely between the cause and the effect,
but between the first stages of the effect and its subsequent stages.
That a body _in vacuo_ falls sixteen feet in the first second,
forty-eight in the second, and so on in the ratio of the odd numbers, is
as much an uniform sequence as that when the supports are removed the
body falls. The sequence of spring and summer is as regular and
invariable as that of the approach of the sun and spring: but we do not
consider spring to be the cause of summer; it is evident that both are
successive effects of the heat received from the sun, and that,
considered merely in itself, spring might continue for ever, without
having the slightest tendency to produce summer. As we have so often
remarked, not the conditional, but the unconditional invariable
antecedent is termed the cause. That which would not be followed by the
effect unless something else had preceded, is not the cause, however
invariable the sequence may in fact be.