A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
It is in this way that most of those uniformities of succession are
generated, which are not cases of causation. When a phenomenon goes on
increasing, or periodically increases and diminishes, or goes through
any continued and unceasing process of variation reducible to an uniform
rule or law of succession, we do not on this account presume that any
two successive terms of the series are cause and effect. We presume the
contrary; we expect to find that the whole series originates either from
the continued action of fixed causes, or from causes which go through a
corresponding process of continuous change. A tree grows from half an
inch high to a hundred feet; and some trees will generally grow to that
height, unless prevented by some counteracting cause. But we do not call
the seedling the cause of the full-grown tree; the invariable antecedent
it certainly is, and we know very imperfectly on what other antecedents
the sequence is contingent, but we are convinced that it is contingent
on something; because the homogeneousness of the antecedent with the
consequent, the close resemblance of the seedling to the tree in all
respects except magnitude, and the graduality of the growth, so exactly
resembling the progressively accumulating effect produced by the long
action of some one cause, leave no possibility of doubting that the
seedling and the tree are two terms in a series of that description, the
first term of which is yet to seek. The conclusion is further confirmed
by this, that we are able to prove by strict induction the dependence of
the growth of the tree, and even of the continuance of its existence,
upon the continued repetition of certain processes of nutrition, the
rise of the sap, the absorptions and exhalations by the leaves, &c.; and
the same experiments would probably prove to us that the growth of the
tree is the accumulated sum of the effects of these continued processes,
were we not, for want of sufficiently microscopic eyes, unable to
observe correctly and in detail what those effects are.
This supposition by no means requires that the effect should not, during
its progress, undergo many modifications besides those of quantity, or
that it should not sometimes appear to undergo a very marked change of
character. This may be either because the unknown cause consists of
several component elements or agents, whose effects, accumulating
according to different laws, are compounded in different proportions at
different periods in the existence of the organized being; or because,
at certain points in its progress, fresh causes or agencies come in, or
are evolved, which intermix their laws with those of the prime agent.
CHAPTER XVI.
OF EMPIRICAL LAWS.