Enfranchisement of women : $b Reprinted from the Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review, for July 1851 — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
Enfranchisement of women : $b Reprinted from the Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review, for July 1851
John Stuart Mill · en
In what we have said on the effect of the inferior position of women,
combined with the present constitution of married life, we have thus
far had in view only the most favorable cases, those in which there
is some real approach to that union and blending of characters and
of lives which the theory of the relation contemplates as its ideal
standard. But if we look to the great majority of cases, the effect
of women's legal inferiority on the character both of women and of
men must be painted in far darker colors. We do not speak here of the
grosser brutalities, nor of the man's power to seize on the woman's
earnings, or compel her to live with him against her will. We do not
address ourselves to any one who requires to have it proved that
these things should be remedied. We suppose average cases, in which
there is neither complete union nor complete disunion of feelings and
of character; and we affirm that in such cases the influence of the
dependence on the woman's side is demoralizing to the character of both.
The common opinion is, that, whatever may be the case with the
intellectual, the moral influence of women over men is almost always
salutary. It is, we are often told, the great counteractive of
selfishness. However the case may be as to personal influence, the
influence of the position tends eminently to promote selfishness.
The most insignificant of men, the man who can obtain influence or
consideration nowhere else, finds one place where he is chief and head.
There is one person, often greatly his superior in understanding, who
is obliged to consult him, and whom he is not obliged to consult. He
is judge, magistrate, ruler, over their joint concerns; arbiter of
all differences between them. The justice or conscience to which her
appeal must be made is his justice and conscience; it is his to hold
the balance and adjust the scales between his own claims or wishes
and those of another. He is now the only tribunal, in civilized life,
in which the same person is judge and party. A generous mind, in such
a situation, makes the balance incline against its own side, and
gives the other not less, but more than a fair equality; and thus the
weaker side may be enabled to turn the very fact of dependence into an
instrument of power, and, in default of justice, take an ungenerous
advantage of generosity; rendering the unjust power, to those who
make an unselfish use of it, a torment and a burthen. But how is it
when average men are invested with this power, without reciprocity
and without responsibility? Give such a man the idea that he is
first in law and in opinion,--that to will is his part, and hers to
submit; it is absurd to suppose that this idea merely glides over his
mind, without sinking into it, or having any effect on his feelings
and practice. The propensity to make himself the first object of
consideration, and others at most the second, is not so rare as to be
wanting where everything seems purposely arranged for permitting its