The Geneva Protocol — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Geneva Protocol
John Stuart Mill · en
But the notion that _any_ State or any combination of States, less than
world-wide, _could_ be substantially self-sufficient in respect of
_all_ raw materials is untenable. Even the United States lacks
(mentioning minerals only) nickel, cobalt, platinum, tin, diamonds.
Its supplies of the following are inadequate: antimony, asbestos,
kaolin, chromate, corundum, garnet, manganese, emery, nitrates, potash,
pumice, tungsten, vanadium, zirconium. Outside of minerals we lack
jute, copra, flax fiber, raw silk, tea, coffee, spices, etc. This mere
enumeration suggests the absurdity of the "raw materials" argument
against the _status quo_.[13]
Without going into it in detail, the mere fact that there are no copper
mines in Germany[14] or in England has never prevented either country
from obtaining all the copper that it needed by means of the exchange
of its own commodities and its own labor for the copper, say, of Spain,
or of the United States, or of Chili; and from any possible point of
view that is now conceivable it is only by the continuance of such a
system that the deficiency of particular articles in particular
countries can be supplied.
All that we can say is, in other words, that so long as the people in a
particular country are able to produce enough of something that the
rest of the world needs, so long will they be able to supply their own
necessities. And if in any country, in Labrador, for example, the
people are unable, because of the situation of the country, to produce
a sufficiency of consumable and exchangeable commodities, the
inevitable result will be the evacuation of that country by civilized
human beings. If such a result could be changed by conquest, the
change would be only temporary. To attempt to change it by agreement
would be to attempt a sort of international charity by means of which
{41} people would be able to live in Labrador by the use of part of the
surplus production, say, of Kentucky, given to them for nothing.
There is a very exaggerated notion in the minds of some as to the
effect of what is called "control of raw materials."
Of course, in time of war, control of raw materials _has_ importance.
But this does not mean "control" in the sense of _ownership_ of foreign
supplies, as, _e. g._, British ownership of Persian oil fields or
American ownership of Bolivian tin mines. It means merely either (1)
the possession of adequate domestic supplies, or (2) safe and unimpeded
_access_ to foreign sources of supply, as, _e. g._, German access,
during the war, to Swedish iron ore. The military significance of raw
materials, aside from purely domestic supplies, is related to such
things as naval power, blockade, "freedom of the seas," "free transit,"
etc., rather than to national _ownership_ of sources of supplies.
_Access to the market_ is the important thing, although the question of
finance may be more difficult in respect of foreign supplies than of
domestic.