The Geneva Protocol — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Geneva Protocol
John Stuart Mill · en
Under the Protocol, the agreement of the parties thereto (Article 2)
not to resort to war with one another is, if the terms of the Protocol
are carried out, absolute. The only stated exceptions in Article 2 of
the Protocol are (1) in case of resistance to acts of aggression and
(2) when acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly under the
Covenant or the Protocol.
The first exception relates to defence and, if there be no aggression,
as there would not be if the Protocol is lived up to, there would never
be any need of defence against aggression.
The second exception, so far as it relates to a Party to the Protocol
against whom force might be used, relates primarily to an aggressor, as
defined in the Protocol. Of course this second exception in this
regard goes beyond the question of defence, strictly speaking, because
it would permit a State, not attacked, to go to the defence of another
State attacked if and when the application of the Sanctions of the
Protocol is called for by the Council[1]; but if the Parties to the
Protocol carry out their agreements as therein expressed, there could
never be any war between two or more of them.
There appears to be another possibility of the use of force within the
language of this second exception; this is the case where a State,
against which has gone a decision of the Court or an arbitral award,
fails to carry out the decision or award.
The provision of the Covenant regarding such a situation is contained
in Article 13, where it is said that the Council shall "propose what
steps should be taken to give effect" to such decision or award.
Obviously such proposals by the Council would not have any binding
effect upon the Members of the League.
However, under the Covenant, the State in whose favor the decision or
award had gone _might_ lawfully have resorted to war against the State
refusing to carry out the decision or award, {51} provided merely that
it delayed resort to war for three months thereafter, under the
language of Article 12 of the Covenant. In other words, if an award or
decision was made and a State refused to carry it out, the successful
party, under the Covenant agreed merely to refrain from war against the
defeated party for a period of three months.
The Protocol (Article 4(6)), as interpreted by the Report to the
Assembly, still permits the successful party to use force in such a
case but only when the Council authorizes the use of force, such
authorization being brought within the terms of Article 13 of the
Covenant.
It is true that the Council is first to exert its influence to secure
compliance with the decision or award and that, if the use of this
influence fails, the Council may then propose measures short of force
before authorizing the use of force itself.