The Geneva Protocol — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Geneva Protocol
John Stuart Mill · en
Indeed, the Report[2] says that the Council may "institute[3] against
the recalcitrant party collective sanctions of an economic or financial
order." If this means that the Signatories to the Protocol are
obligated to employ such sanctions in such a case when called on by the
Council, I can only say that, in my opinion, the statement is not
warranted by any language of the Protocol or of the Covenant.
However, the final effect of these provisions is that with the
authorization of the Council the successful party _may_ use force to
execute a judicial decree or arbitral award.
Furthermore, the Report to the Assembly says that in such a case the
defeated party could not resist, and that, if it did resist, it would
become an aggressor against whom all the Sanctions of the Protocol
might be brought into play.
To see how this would work out, let us suppose that in an arbitration
between State A and State B, State A obtained an award to the effect
that State B should pay to it the sum of twenty million dollars.
Thereupon State B refuses to pay the award and, notwithstanding the
efforts of the Council, maintains that {52} refusal, thereby violating
its agreement in the Protocol (and in the Covenant also) to carry out
any such award.
Thereupon the Council authorizes State A to use force to collect the
money. It is no answer to this to say that the Council would not
authorize the use of force, for we are considering what may be done,
not what would be done. State A then begins to use force and, if State
B resists at all, the entire machinery of the Sanctions of the Protocol
can be brought into play and these include military and naval Sanctions.
Of course, such a result would be highly improbable, but I submit that
it ought to be legally impossible. The provisions of the Protocol in
this regard go very much farther than they ought to go, and very much
farther, in my opinion, than the States of the world are now willing to
go.
The case which I have supposed is one of a money judgment. A more
difficult case would be one where the award was for the recovery by
State A of certain territory in the possession of State B which State B
thereupon refused to give up. In such a case there is more to be said
for the use of force than in the other.
In any case, the refusal of a State to carry out the judicial decision
or the arbitral award after solemnly agreeing to do so is a very
serious breach of a treaty; but the idea of the authorization of force
to execute such a decision seems to me to present a question of the
very gravest character. My own view is against it. I am inclined to
think that the penalty of expulsion from the League under the fourth
paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant should be the utmost
permissible.