The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt
John Stuart Mill · en
"I am here at the instance of that lady (pointing to Mrs. Surratt)
whom I never saw until yesterday, and never heard of, she being a
Maryland lady; and thinking that I could be of service to her, and
protesting as she has done her innocence to me--of the facts I know
nothing--because I deemed it right, I deemed it due to the character
of the profession to which I belong, and which is not inferior to the
noble profession of which you are members, that she should not go
undefended. I knew I was to do it voluntarily, without compensation;
the law prohibits me from receiving compensation; but if it did not,
understanding her condition, I should never have dreamed of refusing
upon the ground of her inability to make compensation."
General Harris, in reply, insisted that the remarks of Mr. Johnson,
explanatory of the letter, corroborated his construction. "I understand
him to say that the doctrine which he taught the people of his state was,
that because the Convention had framed an oath, which was unconstitutional
and illegal in his opinion, therefore it had no moral binding force, and
that people might take it and then go and vote without any regard to the
subject matter, of the oath."
Mr. Johnson, interrupting, denied having said any such thing. General
Hunter, thereupon, to help his colleague out, had the remarks read from
the record. Mr. Johnson assenting to the correctness of the report,
General Harris continued: "If that language does not justify my
conclusion, I confess I am unable to understand the English language;" and
then repeated his construction of the letter.
After he had concluded, Mr. Johnson endeavored to show the author of
"Calvinism Vindicated" that he did not understand the English language, by
pointing out the distinction between stating "there was no harm in taking
an oath, and telling the people of Maryland that there would be no harm in
breaking it after it was taken." Again repelling the misconstruction
attempted to be put upon his words, he proceeded to open a new line as
follows:
"But, as a legal question, it is something new to me that the objection,
if it was well founded in fact is well founded in law. Who gives to the
Court the jurisdiction to decide upon the moral character of the counsel
who may appear before them? Who makes them the arbiters of the public
morality and professional morality? What authority have they, under their
commission, to rule me out, or to rule any other counsel out, upon the
ground, above all, that he does not recognize the validity of an oath,
even if they believed it?"