Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche · en
_The Principle of Equilibrium._—The robber and the man of power who
promises to protect a community from robbers are perhaps at bottom beings
of the same mould, save that the latter attains his ends by other means
than the former—that is to say, through regular imposts paid to him by the
community, and no longer through forced contributions. (The same relation
exists between merchant and pirate, who for a long period are one and the
same person: where the one function appears to them inadvisable, they
exercise the other. Even to-day mercantile morality is really nothing but
a refinement on piratical morality—buying in the cheapest market, at prime
cost if possible, and selling in the dearest.) The essential point is that
the man of power promises to maintain the equilibrium against the robber,
and herein the weak find a possibility of living. For either they must
group themselves into an equivalent power, or they must subject themselves
to some one of equivalent power (_i.e._ render service in return for his
efforts). The latter course is generally preferred, because it really
keeps two dangerous beings in check—the robber through the man of power,
and the man of power through the standpoint of advantage; for the latter
profits by treating his subjects with graciousness and tolerance, in order
that they may support not only themselves but their ruler. As a matter of
fact, conditions may still be hard and cruel enough, yet in comparison
with the complete annihilation that was formerly always a possibility, men
breathe freely.—The community is at first the organisation of the weak to
counterbalance menacing forces. An organisation to outweigh those forces
would be more advisable, if its members grew strong enough to destroy the
adverse power: and when it is a question of one mighty oppressor, the
_attempt will_ certainly be made. But if the one man is the head of a
clan, or if he has a large following, a rapid and decisive annihilation is
improbable, and a long or permanent feud is only to be expected. This
feud, however, involves the least desirable condition for the community,
for it thereby loses the time to provide for its means of subsistence with
the necessary regularity, and sees the product of all work hourly
threatened. Hence the community prefers to raise its power of attack and
defence to the exact plane on which the power of its dangerous neighbour
stands, and to give him to understand that an equal weight now lies in its
own side of the scales—so why not be good friends?—Thus equilibrium is a
most important conception for the understanding of the ancient doctrines
of law and morals. Equilibrium is, in fact, the basis of justice. When
justice in ruder ages says, “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,” it
presupposes the attainment of this equilibrium and tries to maintain it by
means of this compensation; so that, when crime is committed, the injured
party will not take the revenge of blind anger. By means of the _jus