Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia--Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it 325 Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished 326 Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and Turpe--Proof of the first point 327 Proof of the second point _ib._ The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure for him. To be punished is best for him 328 Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought to keep him unpunished 329 Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed by Kalliklês whether he means it seriously 330 Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery _ib._ Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness 331 Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the Platonic meaning _ib._ Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency between the general answer of Polus and his previous declarations--Law and Nature 332 The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, will not hold 334 Worse or better--for whom? The argument of Sokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, the definition would be inadmissible _ib._ Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it 335 If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in which punishment is considered would be reversed 336 Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily distemper--Material difference between the two--Distemper must be felt by the distempered persons 337 Kalliklês begins to argue against Sokrates--he takes a distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly understood 338 What Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample of the teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês--rhetor and politician 339 Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kalliklês is made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it 340 Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends the negative 343 Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical? 344