Here we have again, brought into prominent relief, the dialectic method of Plato, under two distinct aspects: 1. Its actual effects, in exposing the false supposition of knowledge, in forcing upon the respondent the humiliating conviction, that he does not know familiar topics which he supposed to be clear both to himself and to others. 2. Its anticipated effects, if continued, in remedying such defect: and in generating out of the mind of the respondent, real and living knowledge. Lastly, it is plainly intimated that this shock of humiliation and mistrust, painful but inevitable, must be undergone in youth. [Side-note: Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent importance--What is myself? My mind is myself.] The dialogue continues, in short questions and answers, of which the following is an abstract. _Sokr._--What is meant by a man _taking care of himself_? Before I can take care of myself, I must know what myself is: I must _know myself_, according to the Delphian motto. I cannot make myself better, without knowing what _myself_ is.[20] That which belongs to me is not _myself_: my body is not myself, but an instrument governed by myself.[21] My mind or soul only, is myself. To take care of myself is, to take care of my mind. At any rate, if this be not strictly true,[22] my mind is the most important and dominant element within me. The physician who knows his own body, does not for that reason know himself: much less do the husbandman or the tradesman, who know their own properties or crafts, know themselves, or perform what is truly their own business. [Footnote 20: Plato, Alkib. i. 129 B. [Greek: ti/n' a)\n tro/pon eu(rethei/ê _au)to\ to\ au)to/_?]] [Footnote 21: Plato, Alkib. i. 128-130. All this is greatly expanded in the dialogue--p. 128 D: [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra o)/tan tô=n sautou= e)pimelê=|, sautou= e)pime/lei?] This same antithesis is employed by Isokrates, De Permutatione, sect. 309, p. 492, Bekker. He recommends [Greek: au)tou= pro/teron ê)\ tô=n au)tou= poiei=sthai tê\n e)pime/leian].] [Footnote 22: Plato considers this point to be not clearly made out. Alkib. i. 130.] [Side-note: I cannot know myself, except by looking into another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom.]