_Sokr._--You ought not to denounce ignorance in this unqualified manner. You must distinguish and specify. Ignorance of what? and under what modifications of persons and circumstances? _Alk._--How? Are there _any_ matters or circumstances in which it is better for a man to be ignorant, than to know? _Sokr._--You will see that there are such. Ignorance of good, or ignorance of what is best, is always mischievous: moreover, assuming that a man knows what is best, then all other knowledge will be profitable to him. In his special case, ignorance on any subject cannot be otherwise than hurtful. But if a man be ignorant things of good, or of what is best, in his case knowledge on other subjects will be more often hurtful than profitable. To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question, "What is good?" as to resolve to kill his mother, it would be a real benefit, if for the time he did not know his mother. Ignorance on that point, in his state of mind, would be better for him than knowledge.[31] _Alk._--It appears so. [Footnote 31: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 144.] [Side-note: Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used.] _Sokr._--Follow the argument farther. When we come forward to say or do any thing, we either know what we are about to say and do, or at least believe ourselves to know it. Every statesman who gives counsel to the public, does so in the faith of such knowledge. Most citizens are unwise, and ignorant of good as well as of other things. The wise are but few, and by their advice the city is conducted. Now upon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public counsellors? If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it is best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best--should we call him wise? If he knows how to kill men, or dispossess them, or drive them into exile,--but does not know upon whom, or on what occasions, it is good to inflict this treatment--is he a useful counsellor? If he can ride, or shoot, or wrestle, well,--we give him an epithet derived from this special accomplishment: we do not call him wise. What would be the condition of a community composed of bowmen, horsemen, wrestlers, rhetors, &c., accomplished and excellent each in his own particular craft, yet none of them knowing what is good, nor when, nor on what occasions, it is good to employ their craft? When each man pushes forward his own art and speciality, without any knowledge whether it is good on the whole either for himself or for the city, will not affairs thus conducted be reckless and disastrous?[32] _Alk._--They will be very bad indeed. [Footnote 32: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145.] [Side-note: Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial.]