There are names better and worse--more like, or less like to the things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior way 318 All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some are opposed to it 319 It is not true to say, That Things can only be known through their names 320 Unchangeable Platonic Forms--opposed to the Herakleitean flux, which is true only respecting sensible particulars _ib._ Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not put implicit faith in names 321 Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other Sophists _ib._ Theory laid down by Sokrates _à priori_, in the first part--Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into harmony with facts 322 Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue--he disconnects his theory of Naming from the Herakleitean doctrine 324 Ideal of the best system of naming--the Name-Giver ought to be familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his names according to resemblances among them 325 Comparison of Plato's views about naming with those upon social institutions. Artistic, systematic construction--contrasted with unpremeditated unsystematic growth 327 Politikus compared with Kratylus 328 Ideal of Plato--Postulate of the One Wise Man--Badness of all reality 329 Comparison of Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in treatment of the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false propositions 331 Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of handling the same subject 332 No common didactic purpose pervading the Dialogues--each is a distinct composition, working out its own peculiar argument _ib._ CHAPTER XXXII. PHILEBUS. Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus 334 Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative procedure 335 Enquiry--What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? Good and Happiness--correlative and co-extensive. Philêbus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence _ib._ Good--object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals, and plants--all-sufficient--satisfies all desires _ib._ Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are so likewise 336 Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? Appeal to individual choice 337 First Question submitted to Protarchus--Intense Pleasure, without any intelligence--He declines to accept it 338 Second Question--Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer--_No_ _ib._ It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium Quid. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate with it than Pleasure 339