Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3 — Plato — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
Plato · en
Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself the
measure for all. Counter proposition to the formula _ib._
Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state
explicitly the counter-proposition 150
Unpopularity of the Protagorean formula--Most believers insist
upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for
themselves. Appeal to Abstractions 150
Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the Protagorean
formula--Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of
examining for himself Aristotle's canons of truth 152
Plato's examination of the other doctrine--That knowledge is
Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are
different with different Percipients 153
Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions
of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense--weighing,
measuring, &c. 154
Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence
between one man and another arises, not merely from different
sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative difference
155
Argument--That sensible Perception does not include
memory--Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include
memory 157
Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same
time _ib._
Sokrates maintains that we do not see _with_ our eyes, but that
the mind sees _through_ the eyes: that the mind often conceives
and judges by itself without the aid of any bodily organ 159
Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by itself--It
perceives Existence, Difference, &c. 160
Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the
Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add
computations of the mind respecting them 161
Examination of this view--Distinction from the views of modern
philosophers 162
Different views given by Plato in other dialogues 163
Plato's discussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable
advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation,
first to Opinion, then to Cognition 164
Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from
facts of sense, as either necessary or possible 168
Second definition given by Theætêtus--That Cognition consists in
right or true opinion _ib._
Objection by Sokrates--This definition assumes that there are
false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we
conceive Non-Ens: or confound together two distinct realities?
_ib._
Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are
engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present
sensations with past impressions 169
Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is
impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know 170
He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it
actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons
turned into it and flying about _ib._